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I. INTRODUCTION 
Thousands of lives, the national treasury, and the continuation of a 
years-long war hung in the balance when, in 1848, Nicholas Trist, the 
United States Deputy Secretary of State, sat across the negotiating 
table from his Mexican counterparts.
1
 President James K. Polk had 
ordered Trist to return home from Mexico five months earlier.
2
 But 
Trist disobeyed, and instead continued to negotiate with the Mexican 
representatives.
3
 Because of Trist’s decision to remain, the Mexican-
American War ended by way of peaceful agreement in early 1848.
4
 
More than a century and a half later, in February 2003, an American 
diplomat named John Brady Kiesling resigned by protest letter—and 
widely published editorial—in opposition to America’s unilateral 
action in the run-up to the Iraq War.
5
 A few months after that, 
another American diplomat, Joseph Wilson, shed light on potential 
inaccuracies in the Bush Administration’s justification for the Iraq 
War, also through an opinion editorial.
6
 These three individuals—
 
 *  J.D. (2014), Washington University School of Law; B.S. and B.A. (2010), Duke 
University. 
 1. See generally ROBERT W. DREXLER, GUILTY OF MAKING PEACE: A BIOGRAPHY OF 
NICHOLAS P. TRIST (1991). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Letter from John Brady Kiesling, U.S. Diplomat, to Colin Powell, U.S. Sec’y of State 
(Feb. 27, 2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/27/international/27WEB-
TNAT.html. 
 6. Joseph C. Wilson, IV, What I Didn’t Find in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/06/opinion/what-i-didn-t-find-in-africa.html? 
pagewanted=all &src=pm. 
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Trist, Kiesling, and Wilson—stand as stark examples of dissenters in 
American foreign policy.
7
 In modern foreign relations, the stakes are 
often just as high as those that were involved in the Mexican-
American War peace negotiations.
8
  
Foreign relations and treaty making are essential functions of any 
legitimate government.
9
 The President has the authority to make 
international agreements on behalf of the United States,
10
 and the 
Senate or Congress as a whole must approve any treaties.
11
 But those 
with the most knowledge of the subject—the officials sitting at the 
negotiating table or working in the foreign embassy—do not have the 
ultimate say in whether a foreign relations policy or treaty is 
presented to Congress for consideration; that power lies exclusively 
with the President.
12
 In response to increasingly vocal dissent by 
Foreign Service officers during the Vietnam War, the Department of 
State designed a process that purported to give those officers a voice 
to oppose decisions by their superiors called the Dissent Channel.
13
 
 
 7. For a discussion on the history of dissent in the United States Foreign Service in the 
twentieth century, see HANNAH GURMAN, THE DISSENT PAPERS: THE VOICES OF DIPLOMATS IN 
THE COLD WAR AND BEYOND (2012). 
 8. For a listing of some issues facing President Barack Obama and his administration 
during his second term, including nuclear proliferation, global crisis hotspots, and international 
trade, see Chaesung Chun et al., Global Advice for Obama’s Second Term, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/global-advice-obamas-
second-term/p29940.  
 9. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (asserting the power to make treaties is 
part of a wider class of powers that “forms an obvious and essential branch of the federal 
administration”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay) (“The power of making treaties is an 
important one . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the 
practicalities of the exercise of the treaty-making power). 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 11. Id. See also Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of 
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1255 (2008). 
 12. 11 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 720, §§ 724.1, 724.7 (2006), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/88317.pdf (Only the Secretary of 
State can authorize the initiation of an international negotiation and certify the final form of the 
agreement when the negotiators are done.); 11 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
MANUAL 720, § 723.2-1 (2006) (Treaties are submitted to Congress by the President, not by 
negotiators.); 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (2014) (The Secretary of State, not negotiators, presents all 
international agreements, other than treaties, to Congress.). The Department of State’s 
organizational structure also reflects this hierarchy. Department Organization Chart, U.S. 
DEP’T OF ST. (May 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/99494.htm.  
 13. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL VOL. 2, NO. 070, DISSENT CHANNEL 
§§ 071.1(a), 073(b), 074.1(b) (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
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Today, through the Dissent Channel, Foreign Service officers can 
send dissenting memoranda directly to their superiors.
14
  
But the Dissent Channel can also be used to neutralize opposition 
by quarantining dissent within the bureaucracy.
15
 The recent 
revelations by former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor 
Edward Snowden have demonstrated the impact any government 
employee with access to sensitive information can have when the 
employee lacks a constructive outlet for dissent within the 
bureaucratic structure.
16
  
This Note addresses the structural allocation of power over 
foreign policy in the United States’ federalist system and suggests 
that the current allocation, which heavily favors the President, can be 
balanced pragmatically only through a robust political check 
combined with a reinvigorated legislative check, both of which would 
require a publicized dissent mechanism and protections for 
dissenters. 
The federal government should undergo significant bureaucratic 
reform to improve modern American diplomacy while maintaining 
political uniformity.
17
 Because the President assumes almost 
exclusive control over foreign policy,
18
 diplomats on the ground 
should have a method through which they can check a President who 
ignores their advice.
19
 Part II of this Note discusses the history of 
 
organization/84374.pdf [hereinafter FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL]; GURMAN, supra note 7, at 171. 
 14. FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 071.1(a), 073(b), 074.1(b). 
 15. GURMAN, supra note 7, at 189. 
 16. Although Edward Snowden’s motives for leaking sensitive material are up for debate, 
his claim that he had no one to go to with his misgivings is cause for deliberation. See Laura 
Poitras, NSA Whistleblower Edward Snowden: “I Don’t Want to Live in a Society that Does 
these Sort of Things,” YOUTUBE (June 9, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5yB3n9fu-
rM. 
 17. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2322–23 (2006). 
 18. The President can negotiate executive agreements without congressional consent. Am. 
Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003). The President can also effectively fire 
diplomats at will. Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 314–15 (1903). Additionally, the 
Constitution is not clear about the delegations of foreign policy authority. Saikrishna B. Prakash 
& Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 237–43 
(2001). This ambiguity, in conjunction with the President’s wide powers, gives the President 
significant leverage over the direction of foreign policy. 
 19. One option is to create a legislatively-imposed requirement for the President to consult 
with relevant agencies prior to taking action. See Katyal, supra note 17, at 2327. 
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United States foreign policy power and its related federalist structure. 
Part III illustrates an early example of the exercise of foreign 
relations power during the Mexican-American War. Part IV discusses 
modern developments in foreign policy, focusing on new 
bureaucratic dissent mechanisms. These modern mechanisms are 
illustrated in Parts V and VI, using two examples from the Iraq War. 
Part VII discusses the potential consequences of maintaining the 
status quo, as illustrated by the recent and ongoing revelations of 
former NSA employee Edward Snowden. Part VIII proceeds to 
analyze the current balance of power in the federalist system and the 
potential for dissent to check the executive. Finally, this Note 
concludes in Part IX by recommending a robust dissent mechanism 
that can be integrated into the federalist system to balance the power 
over foreign relations. 
II. FOREIGN RELATIONS POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Treaties 
The United States federal system is built on checks and balances. 
Thus, one branch of government often needs the cooperation of 
another to make policy.
20
 In the area of foreign policy, the 
Constitution nominally limits the President’s power to make 
international treaties by requiring the Senate’s consent.
21
 
Additionally, the President’s power to appoint the Secretary of State 
and ambassadors is limited by similar constitutional requirements of 
Senate approval.
22
 
The Founders debated the role the President and Congress should 
have in completing international treaties.
23
 Some framers wanted the 
 
 20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In pertinent part, the Constitution provides the President 
“shall have Power, by and with the Advice of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds 
of the Senators present concur.” Id. 
 22. Id. The Constitution continues by giving the President the power to “nominate, and by 
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, 
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by 
Law.” Id. 
 23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/14
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power to be vested solely in the President.
24
 Others proposed the 
Senate should be the only body involved in treaty making.
25
 A third 
faction argued the Senate and House should both be involved in the 
decision.
26
 Alexander Hamilton responded to all of these concerns in 
The Federalist No. 75. According to Hamilton, the treaty-making 
power contains both legislative and executive components: legislative 
in that binding treaties apply as law over the American people, and 
executive in that treaties are like contracts between two sovereigns.
27
 
The dual nature of the treaty-making power led to the final language 
used in the Constitution: the President may make treaties “by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.”
28
 Two-thirds of the 
Senate must approve a treaty before it becomes binding.
29
 
Although the Founders placed the treaty-making power in the 
hands of the President and the Senate, Presidents have used other 
procedures to enact international agreements. One of these 
procedures, called the Congressional-Executive agreement, allows 
the President to enact international agreements by involving the 
House of Representatives.
30
 These agreements are “concluded by the 
President and either authorized in advance or approved after the fact 
through the same process used for ordinary federal legislation.”
31
 
They must be approved by a majority of both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate,
32
 rather than by two-thirds of the 
Senate as required under the Treaty Clause.
33
 
Alternatively, the President can package international agreements 
as sole executive agreements.
34
 These agreements are either a 
byproduct of a prior treaty obligation or are completed pursuant to 
the President’s constitutional powers; they go into effect without the 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Hathaway, supra note 11, at 1244–46. 
 31. Id. at 1255. 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Hathaway, supra note 11, at 1238–39 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Hathaway, supra note 11, at 1238–39. 
 34. Hathaway, supra note 11, at 1255. 
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need for congressional approval.
35
 The earliest sole executive 
agreements were narrow in scope, and Presidents would use them 
under an enumerated power reserved for the President.
36
 This 
practice has been found constitutional.
37
 The Supreme Court held 
“the President has authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with 
other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by 
Congress, this power having been exercised since the early years of 
the Republic.”
38
 
Today, the distinction that once existed between treaties and 
agreements has been lost.
39
 Some commentators and courts have 
sought to decipher the original distinction by referring to past 
international law theorists, most notably Emerich de Vattel.
40
 The 
Supreme Court in Holmes v. Jennison noted that de Vattel defined 
“treaty” as “a compact made with a view to the public welfare, by the 
superior power, either for perpetuity, or for a considerable time.”
41
 
The Court also cited de Vattel’s definition of “agreements” as 
“compacts which have temporary matters for their objects.”
42
 Thus, 
one possible distinction between treaties and agreements is their 
intended longevity, and this distinction could inform the proper uses 
of the two instruments.
43
 However, the terms “treaty” and 
“agreement” were conflated early in the history of the United States, 
and modern commentators and courts have not come to a consensus 
on their proper uses.
44
 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573, 
1584 (2007). 
 37. Am. Ins. Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 415.  
 38. Id. The Court held that a California state law impermissibly conflicted with an 
executive agreement settling Holocaust-related insurance claims. Id. at 407–09, 411–13, 420. 
The Court’s ruling thus reinforced the principle that executive agreements not subject to 
congressional approval can preempt state laws, just as treaties do. See id. at 415–17. 
 39. Clark, supra note 36, at 1593–94. 
 40. Id. at 1592.  
 41. Holmes v. Jennison, 30 U.S. 540, 572 (1840). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Clark, supra note 36, at 1592–93. Clark notes longer lasting treaties may have been 
used mostly in the areas of peace and commerce, while agreements were meant to cover 
international boundary settlements. 
 44. Id. at 1594. See also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 463 
(1978). 
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B. Personnel 
The President also has wide power to fire government 
employees.
45
 In Shurtleff v. United States,
46
 the Supreme Court found 
“the President can, by virtue of his general power of appointment, 
remove an officer, even though appointed by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.”
47
 The Court supported an expansive 
presidential authority over personnel decisions, stating, “[I]t must be 
assumed that the President acts with reference to his constitutional 
duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.”
48
 This 
assumption effectively provides the President with “the right . . . to 
remove for any other reason which he, acting with a due sense of his 
official responsibility, should think sufficient,” even if the relevant 
statute only provides for dismissal under certain circumstances.
49
 The 
President has virtual plenary power to terminate executive personnel, 
including diplomats. 
III. NICHOLAS TRIST AND THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR:  
1845–1848 
The treaty-making and appointment powers played crucial roles 
during the Mexican-American War. President James K. Polk, who 
assumed the presidency in 1845, made clear he would fully support 
the annexation of Texas on the day of his inauguration.
50
 When this 
 
 45. See Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 314–15 (1903). 
 46. 189 U.S. 311 (1903). 
 47. Id. at 315. 
 48. Id. at 317. 
 49. Id. As an example, the Court noted the Constitution’s Article II listing of permissible 
reasons for removal of civil officers: 
By the 4th section of article 2 of the Constitution it is provided that all civil officers 
shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, 
or other high crimes and misdemeanors. No one has ever supposed that the effect of 
this section was to prevent their removal for other causes deemed sufficient by the 
President. No such inference could be reasonably drawn from such language.  
Id. 
 50. James K. Polk, Address by James K. Polk, 1845, JOINT CONG. COMM. ON INAUGURAL 
CEREMONIES, http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/swearing-in/address/address-by-james-k-polk-
1845 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
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agenda clashed with Mexico’s intent to retain Texas, the United 
States and Mexico went to war.
51
 Polk eventually sent “Mr. N. P. 
Trist, the chief clerk of the Department of State,” to negotiate a peace 
treaty.
52
 
Trist took many precautions to keep his journey to Mexico secret, 
but they were all in vain; Trist’s mission was published in numerous 
American newspapers by the time he was sailing in the Gulf of 
Mexico.
53
 The trip from Washington, D.C., to Veracruz, Mexico, 
took Trist twenty-one days to complete.
54
 Within a day of his 
landing, Trist learned the political instability in Mexico would 
complicate his mission.
55
 First, there was effectively no functioning 
government in Mexico to negotiate with at the time.
56
 Second, the 
remaining members of the Mexican government who did retain some 
authority had decreed official negotiations with American 
representatives to be criminal.
57
 In late August 1847, just over three 
months after Trist’s arrival, United States forces camped outside 
Mexico City in preparation to take the capital; peace negotiations 
began in earnest.
58
 
During the course of negotiations, Trist received intelligence that 
Mexican leadership was unhappy with the draft treaty.
59
 In early 
September, Mexican negotiators demanded treaty revisions, and Trist 
sent the revised treaty back to Washington.
60
 Days later, while 
awaiting word from Washington, fighting resumed, and United States 
troops occupied Mexico City.
61
 
 
 51. MATT M. MATTHEWS, THE U.S. ARMY ON THE MEXICAN BORDER: A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 17 (2007), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/LPS109781/LPS109781_ 
Matthews_op22.pdf.  
 52. 2 JAMES K. POLK, THE DIARY OF JAMES K. POLK 466–67 (Milo Milton Quaife ed., 8th 
ed. 1910). 
 53. WALLACE OHRT, DEFIANT PEACEMAKER: NICHOLAS TRIST IN THE MEXICAN WAR 
106–07 (1997).  
 54. Id. at 106–08. 
 55. Id. at 111. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. DREXLER, supra note 1, at 87–88. 
 59. Id. at 96. 
 60. Id. at 96–99, 101. 
 61. Id. at 101. 
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On October 6, shortly after receiving the treaty proposal that 
included the Mexican revisions, Secretary of State Buchanan sent a 
letter to Trist recalling him to Washington.
62
 Trist would not receive 
that letter until more than a month later, on November 16.
63
 In the 
meantime, the occupation of Mexico City empowered a faction in the 
Mexican government seeking to end the war to reopen negotiations, 
and Trist made great strides negotiating a peaceful end to the 
conflict.
64
  
But when Buchanan recalled Trist, Trist had to return home. He 
planned to leave on December 5 with the next outgoing supply 
train.
65
 On December 4, his plans suddenly changed.
66
 James 
Freaner, a war correspondent for the New Orleans Delta, was 
reporting on the United States’ military effort from the front line.
67
 
He had bonded with Trist and had become one of his most reliable 
sources of intelligence.
68
 The day before Trist was scheduled to leave 
Mexico, Freaner visited the U.S. negotiator and convinced him to 
stay and complete the treaty.
69
 At that moment, when Trist chose to 
ignore a direct order from his superior, the Secretary of State, he 
became a dissenter. 
Trist completed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and 
Settlements on February 2, 1848.
70
 Trist handed the treaty to Freaner, 
 
 62. Id. at 105. 
 63. Id. at 108. 
 64. Id. at 107–08. The Mexican government had selected new peace commissioners more 
committed to negotiation. Id. at 110. 
 65. Id. at 111. 
 66. Id. at 112. 
 67. Mitchell Roth, Role of the Media: War Correspondents, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/kera 
/usmexicanwar/war/war_correspondents.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
 68. Thomas J. Farnham, Nicholas Trist & James Freaner and the Mission to Mexico, 11 
ARIZ. & W. 247, 252–53 (1969). 
 69. DREXLER, supra note 1, at 113. Freaner implored, “Make the Treaty, Sir! It is now in 
your power to do your country a greater service than any living man can render her. . . . You are 
bound to do it. Instructions or no instructions, you are bound to do it.” Trist responded, “I will 
make the Treaty and . . . you stay here to carry it home.” Id. 
 70. Id. at 124. The treaty is commonly known today as the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. 
See The Avalon Project, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; February 2, 1848, YALE L. SCH., 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/guadhida.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2014). 
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who then raced to deliver it to Washington.
71
 Freaner travelled from 
the heart of Mexico to the White House in just seventeen days.
72
 
The pressures of domestic politics prevented Polk from burying 
the treaty.
73
 Polk’s Democratic Party was divided over the war:
74
 one 
faction opposed taking Mexican land below the Nueces River on 
moral grounds;
75
 and a second group of Democrats, pandering to a 
vocal group of Americans intent on taking all of Mexico, wanted 
more land.
76
 Secretary of State Buchanan found his political 
ambitions served by the latter group.
77
  
Polk’s Cabinet eventually approved the treaty with some 
modifications, mostly out of concern that Congress would cut off 
funding for the war in order to end the conflict.
78
 The treaty went to 
the Senate. After a contentious debate about the legality of a treaty 
negotiated by a recalled diplomat, the Senate approved the treaty on 
March 10, 1848.
79
  
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. The war was unpopular, and President Polk was unwilling to give the Whigs political 
fodder. OHRT, supra note 53, at 148–49. 
 74. Robert A. Brent, Reaction in the United States to Nicholas Trist’s Mission to Mexico, 
1847–48, 35/36 REVISTA DE HISTORIA DE AMÉRICA 105, 110 (1953). The other major political 
party, the Whigs, opposed the annexation of any more land, because of their opposition to 
slavery and to the Democratic Party. Id. at 110.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.; OHRT, supra note 53, at 147. 
 77. Polk wrote about Buchanan’s changing views as the war dragged on.  
Mr. Buchanan seems to have changed his views upon the subject. Until recently he had 
expressed his opinion against acquiring any other territory than the Californias & New 
Mexico. He did not positively express a distinct opinion today; but it was pretty clearly 
to be inferred from what he did say that he was now for more territ[o]ry; and that he 
would favour the policy of acquiring, in addition to the Californias & New Mexico, the 
Province of Tamaulipas and the country East of the Sierra madre mountains, and 
withdrawing our troops to that line. . . . Since he has considered himself as a candidate 
for the Presidency it is probably he looks at the subject with different considerations in 
view from those which he entertained before that time. 
3 JAMES K. POLK, THE DIARY OF JAMES K. POLK 217 (Milo Milton Quaife ed., 8th ed. 1910). 
 78. DREXLER, supra note 1, at 127. 
 79. Id. at 127–28. 
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IV. COMPARISON OF MODERN TREATY MAKING  
TO THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR TREATY PROCESS 
 
Today, the treaty-making procedure is codified in Circular 175.
80
 
State Department officers “seeking authority to negotiate, conclude, 
amend, extend, or terminate an international agreement” must make a 
Circular 175 request from a high-ranking State Department official.
81
 
One of the purposes of the Circular 175 procedure is to unify the 
nation’s foreign policy.
82
 The Secretary of State is the leader of the 
Department,
83
 and the Secretary serves at the pleasure of the 
President,
84
 giving the President great authority in directing United 
States foreign policy.
85 
  
 
 80. Circular 175 was originally published by the U.S. Department of State as a 
Department Circular in 1955, and has since been included in 22 C.F.R. § 181.4 (2013). Circular 
175 Procedure, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., https://web.archive.org/web/20130624134821/http://www. 
state.gov/s/l/treaty/c175 (last visited Nov. 9, 2012). 
 81. Id. The Circular 175 procedure also requires each request to be accompanied by a 
memorandum describing the proposed agreement, its expected effects, and the manner in which 
it will be completed. This “action memorandum” must be submitted with a separate 
Memorandum of Law detailing whether the proposal is a treaty or executive agreement, under 
what legal authority the agreement could be made, and whether domestic laws may complicate 
the proposal’s implementation. Id. 
 82. Id. According to the State Department, “the Circular 175 procedure has provided an 
efficient vehicle for achieving a coordinated and coherent U.S. policy with respect to the 
negotiation and conclusion of treaties and international agreements.” Id. 
 83. Department Organization Chart, supra note 12; see Secretary of State John F. Kerry, 
U.S. DEP’T OF ST., http://www.state.gov/secretary/index.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2014). The 
Secretary also has power over the Department’s personnel: “The Secretary of State may 
prescribe duties for the Assistant Secretaries and the clerks of bureaus, as well as for all the 
other employees in the department, and may make changes and transfers therein when, in his 
judgment, it becomes necessary.” 22 U.S.C. § 2664 (2012). 
 84. Secretary of State John F. Kerry, supra note 83.  
 85. One of the primary indicators of strong presidential authority is the President’s 
exercise of the removal power. Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary 
Executive During the First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1458 (1997). 
Calabresi and Yoo’s analysis concludes that Presidents have historically asserted their power 
over policy in part by removing officers with whom they disagreed. Id. at 1459–60. 
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A. Technology and Foreign Policy 
Communication technology has the potential to play a large role 
in foreign policy and dissent.
86
 In Trist’s day, even with long 
transmission times,
87
 newspapers spread the word quickly.
88
 
Newspaper editorials generally praised the treaty negotiated by 
Trist,
89
 helping legitimize Trist’s dissent by providing the anti-war 
faction at home with a tangible, public rallying point: a peace 
treaty.
90
 
Today, the potential to dissent using communications technology 
is far greater than in Trist’s day. The Pentagon Papers, classified 
documents analyzing United States involvement in Vietnam and 
leaked by Daniel Ellsberg to the press in 1971, incited widespread 
controversy through high profile newspapers with large readerships.
91
 
More recently, the WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden episodes, which 
involved the leaking of troves of classified government documents, 
demonstrated the potential for modern technology to increase the 
ease and magnitude of modern dissent.
92
 Now, with just a few clicks 
 
 86. Congress has found technology to be important enough in this process to codify its 
findings. 22 U.S.C. § 2656a (2012). In the Code: 
The Congress finds that— 
 (1) the consequences of modern scientific and technological advances are of such 
major significance in United States foreign policy that understanding and appropriate 
knowledge of modern science and technology by officers and employees of the United 
States Government are essential in the conduct of modern diplomacy; 
 (2) many problems and opportunities for development in modern diplomacy lie in 
scientific and technological fields . . . . 
Id. 
 87. For example, the letter recalling Trist was sent on October 6, 1847. DREXLER, supra 
note 1, at 105. The letter reached Trist on November 16. Id. at 108. 
 88. See OHRT, supra note 53, at 106–07. 
 89. Brent, supra note 74, at 110–12. 
 90. See Michael Bezilla, U.S.-Mexican War Legitimized Anti-War Movement, Historian 
Says, PENN. ST. UNIV. (Nov. 14, 2012), http://live.psu.edu/story/62724.  
 91. Pentagon Papers, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EB 
checked/topic/450326/Pentagon-Papers (last visited Jan 26, 2013). See also Neil Sheehan, 
Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of Growing U.S. Involvement, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 13, 1971, available at http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/04/13/reviews/papers-overview. 
html.  
 92. See GURMAN, supra note 7, at 197 (discussing WikiLeaks); Barton Gellman & 
Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers Worldwide, Snowden 
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on a computer, disgruntled dissenters can quickly make their 
positions public, often with major political and economic 
consequences. 
B. Modern Bureaucratic Dissent: The Dissent Channel 
A bureaucratic dissent mechanism could be an effective way to 
encourage the President to consider the voices of Foreign Service 
officers on the ground when making policy decisions.
93
 This is the 
stated idea behind the State Department’s Dissent Channel, a 
communication pathway that allows Foreign Service officers to 
register dissent to their superiors.
94
  
The Dissent Channel is “reserved only for consideration of 
responsible dissenting and alternative views on substantive foreign 
policy issues that cannot be communicated in a full and timely 
manner through regular operating channels or procedures.”
95
 The 
Channel is intended as a last resort when traditional and more 
collaborative means are either unavailable or ineffective.
96
 All 
communications through the Dissent Channel go directly to the 
Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff (“S/P”), at which point they are 
distributed to “the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, the Deputy 
Secretary for Management and Resources, the Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs, the Executive Secretary, and the Chair of the 
Secretary’s Open Forum.”
97
  
 
Documents Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-
documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html (discussing 
Snowden); see also John F. Burns & Ravi Somaiya, WikiLeaks Founder Gets Support in 
Rebuking U.S. on Whistle-Blowers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2010/10/24/world/24 london.html?ref=pentagonpapers&_r=0.  
 93. See Katyal, supra note 17, at 2329. 
 94. FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL, supra note 13, § 071.1(b). The listed purpose of the Dissent 
Channel is “to allow its users the opportunity to bring dissenting or alternative views on 
substantive foreign policy issues, when such views cannot be communicated in a full and timely 
manner through regular operating channels or procedures, to the attention of the Secretary of 
State and other senior State Department officials in a manner which protects the author from 
any penalty, reprisal, or recrimination.” Id. 
 95. Id. § 072(a).  
 96. See id. § 072(b)-(d).  
 97. Id. § 074.1(a)-(b). 
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The Dissent Channel, in effect, keeps dissenting opinions within 
the bureaucratic machine.
98
 The impetus for creating the Dissent 
Channel was the increasingly vocal dissent sounded by Foreign 
Service officers during the Vietnam War.
99
 The Channel “allow[ed] 
internal dissenters to let off steam,” while avoiding the impact of 
public debate.
100
 The Channel “made it possible for the State 
Department to formally encourage dissent, while at the same time 
deflating the most serious threat posed by internal dissenters.”101 It 
proved “dissent could be tolerated so long as it remained inside the 
bureaucracy.”
102
  
The Channel also made it possible for presidential administrations 
to more easily identify dissenting Foreign Service members. The first 
Dissent Channel message resulted in a reshuffling of staff at the 
consulate in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in 1971.
103
 Not long after, the State 
Department reassigned a Foreign Service officer who used the 
Dissent Channel to warn about impending violence in Cyprus.
104
 
This latter incident, known as the Boyatt Affair, became part of a 
wider congressional inquiry.
105
 Here was an opportunity for Congress 
to assert oversight authority over the executive branch in the realm of 
foreign policy. But Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was quick to 
prevent such an outcome.
106
 Kissinger argued releasing the dissent 
memorandums to Congress would cause a second coming of 
McCarthyism, by which Congress would be able to target specific 
Foreign Service officers because of their policy opinions.
107
 
According to Kissinger, dissenters’ identities and opinions had to be 
kept within the Department, lest some member of Congress embark 
on a crusade against a specific ideology or strategy.
108
  
 
 98. GURMAN, supra note 7, at 189. 
 99. Id. at 171. 
 100. Id. at 190. 
 101. Id. at 189. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 177–78. 
 104. Id. at 180–81. 
 105. Id. at 186–87. 
 106. Id. at 181. 
 107. Id. at 181–82. 
 108. Id. at 181. 
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But prohibiting Congress from reviewing the dissent 
memorandums in their original format allowed the State Department 
to distort and conceal the dissenters’ messages, significantly limiting 
the potential for dissent to incite congressional action.
109
 Congress 
would have oversight authority in name only. The State Department 
released Thomas Boyatt’s dissent paper to Congress, but it was 
spliced and strewn into an “amalgamation” of dissenting opinions.
110
 
Boyatt could not effectively register his dissent through such a 
medium and later commented, “[The] memorandum was cut into 
pieces, and those pieces were interspersed with other drivel made up 
by S/P [Policy Planning] designed to disguise what was the Boyatt 
memorandum.”
111
  
With the State Department in control of dissenters’ messages, 
there was a risk the Secretary of State would selectively seek 
retribution against specific dissenters. Most dissenters were not 
punished as a result of their opinions.
112
 The pertinent regulation in 
effect today prohibits reprisals for using the Dissent Channel.
113
 Still, 
some dissenters were fired, and some were reassigned to different 
positions by department superiors.
114
 But many were rewarded or 
given more desirable positions by the Department.
115
 The State 
Department had to provide an incentive for dissenters to keep their 
dissent internal. As became apparent to the Department, “in the age 
of mass media, to be a dissenter is to be a potential leaker to the press 
of one’s conflict with the White House.”
116
 After Vietnam, the last 
thing Presidents wanted was a crisis of confidence and an 
administration at the center of controversy.
117
 
 
 109. Id. at 188. 
 110. Id. at 183–84, 188. 
 111. Id. at 188. 
 112. Id. at 189–90. 
 113. FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL, supra note 13, § 071.1(b).  
 114. GURMAN, supra note 7, at 189–90. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 175. 
 117. Id. at 171; 40 Years After Leak, Weighing the Impact of the Pentagon Papers, PBS 
(June 13, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military-jan-june11-pentagonpapers_06-13/ 
(discussing how the information about the Vietnam War released in the Pentagon Papers 
strengthened the position of the dissenter and how President Nixon’s response led to 
Watergate). 
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V. JOSEPH WILSON AND THE IRAQ WAR 
The Dissent Channel could not keep dissent within the 
Department forever, especially in light of technological advancement. 
One scholar recently noted, “In the digital age, when leaks inevitably 
go viral on the Internet, the State Department will have an 
increasingly difficult time preventing the public from gaining access 
to diplomatic dissent writing.”
118
 Such was the case with Joseph 
Wilson, the former diplomat asked by the Bush Administration in 
February 2002 to investigate a suspected Iraqi nuclear program 
linked to Niger.
119
 According to Wilson, the CIA informed him that 
Vice President Dick Cheney’s office was seeking additional 
intelligence on a reported sale of uranium yellowcake by Niger to 
Iraq.
120
 Wilson consulted with the State Department, travelled to 
Niger, spoke with the U.S. ambassador there, investigated the 
uranium mining industry, and reported the sale likely never 
occurred.
121
 Shortly afterwards, when the Administration used the 
Niger connection as part of its justification for war with Iraq, Wilson 
contacted the State Department to remind officials of his findings.
122
 
But Wilson’s efforts were in vain. 
In March 2003, American and coalition forces began bombing 
Baghdad.
123
 In July 2003, the New York Times published an op-ed 
authored by Joseph Wilson describing his investigation, conclusions, 
and interaction with the Administration.
124
 The op-ed ended with a 
call for an investigation into the Administration’s justification for 
war.
125
 Whether the reader believed Wilson’s version of events or 
not, Wilson’s op-ed was undeniably a dissent paper, written for a 
popular audience and published in an internationally circulated 
 
 118. Id. at 197. 
 119. Wilson, supra note 6.  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Jesse Singal et al., Seven Years in Iraq: An Iraq War Timeline, TIME, Mar. 19, 2010, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1967340_1967342_ 
1967398,00.html.  
 124. Wilson, supra note 6. 
 125. Id. 
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newspaper.
126
 Although he was not employed in the Foreign Service 
at the time, he discussed his attempts to address his concerns through 
the State Department in his op-ed.
127
 In the end, he went to the 
press.
128
  
Wilson highlighted the structural imbalance in foreign relations 
power when he noted, “Congress, which authorized the use of 
military force at the president's behest, should want to know if the 
assertions about Iraq were warranted.”
129
 The congressional 
authorization of military force provided much discretion to the 
President, but it also required the President to submit reports to 
Congress explaining why military action was required.
130
 From 
Wilson’s perspective, his dissent was ignored by the Administration, 
and the executive branch was effectively unaccountable to 
congressional oversight.  
When Wilson’s concerns went unaddressed, he resorted to 
influencing public opinion. His dissent record was not written like a 
standard diplomatic memorandum.
131
 Instead, Wilson’s dissent 
record read like a story. The author personalized himself, described 
his thoughts, illustrated his efforts with descriptive language, and 
concluded with a moral imperative.
132
 This form of dissent, whereby 
the author takes a message outside of the bureaucracy and to the 
public, inserted the political check where it formerly did not exist.
133
 
But if the political check was to be effective, reprisals by the 
Administration against a dissenter should have been prohibited, and 
many observers believed the Wilson case ended in reprisal.
134
 Eight 
 
 126. See GURMAN, supra note 7, at 191. 
 127. Wilson, supra note 6. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. See also H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 130. H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. § 3(b) (2002). 
 131. See FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL, supra note 13, § 073.  
 132. Wilson, supra note 6. 
 133. For a discussion of the political check, see D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political 
Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the 
Nation, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 779, 787 (1982). 
 134. Bruce Wilson, Valerie Plame & Joe Wilson Furious as CA Democrats Snub Leader 
Fighting Theocratic Takeover of Military, HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2010), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/bruce-wilson/valerie-plame-joe-wilson_b_594382.html (stating that the 
“outing of Plame’s identity was widely perceived as ultimately partisan, anti-patriotic 
payback”); James B. Stewart, Dangers of Giving In to Impulse for Revenge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
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days after Wilson’s op-ed was published, columnist Robert Novak 
wrote a piece identifying Valerie Plame Wilson, Joseph Wilson’s 
wife, as a CIA operative.
135
 “Wilson never worked for the CIA,” 
wrote Novak, “but his wife, Valerie Plame, is an agency operative on 
weapons of mass destruction.”
136
 Novak cited “[t]wo senior 
administration officials” as sources.
137
 Novak’s disclosure led to an 
investigation into his and eventually other reporters’ sources, 
especially Vice President Dick Cheney’s Chief of Staff, I. Lewis 
“Scooter” Libby.
138
 These sources were investigated for disclosing 
Valerie Plame Wilson’s identity as a CIA operative, which was 
classified information.
139
 Libby was eventually convicted of 
obstructing justice and perjury.
140
 Although Libby was the only 
Administration official to be indicted and convicted, the evidence 
implicated Libby’s superiors in the leak.
141
 A few months after 
Libby’s conviction, President George W. Bush commuted Libby’s 
thirty-month prison sentence,
142
 preventing Libby from serving any 
time.
143
 
The Wilson episode, although not a conclusive demonstration of 
executive power used to discredit dissenters, does elucidate some of 
the powers a President can have over dissent. The Department of 
 
17, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/18/business/the-dangers-of-giving-in-
to-the-revenge-impulse.html?r=0 (describing Plame’s outing as retaliation against Wilson).  
 135. Robert D. Novak, Mission to Niger, WASH. POST, July 14, 2003, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/20/AR2005102000874.html. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Dan Eggen, Background on the CIA Leak Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2005, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/28/AR2005102800818. 
html. See also Matthew Cooper, Bob Novak, Valerie Plame, and Me, ATLANTIC, Aug. 18, 2009, 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/08/bob-novak-valerie-plame-and-
me/23460/.  
 139. Id. 
 140. Jurors Convict Libby on Four of Five Charges, NBC NEWS & NEWS SERVS. (Mar. 6, 
2007), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17479718/ns/politics/t/jurors-convict-libby-four-five-
charges/#.UP16die1eAg.  
 141. Id. 
 142. Amy Goldstein, Bush Commutes Libby’s Prison Sentence, WASH. POST, July 3, 2007, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/02/AR2007070 
200825.html.  
 143. Id. 
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Justice can pressure the press.
144
 The country’s intelligence apparatus 
can discredit and injure the livelihood of a dissenter’s family.
145
 And 
the President’s clemency power can protect the Administration’s “fall 
guy.”
146
 
A. Role of the Judiciary 
To protect their ability to dissent, individuals like Joseph Wilson 
might try to enlist federal prosecutors within the Department of 
Justice to check the President’s power if a law appears to have been 
violated. But with the Department of Justice under the control of the 
executive, such attempts may be in vain. A private cause of action 
could be a potent mechanism to protect dissenters. But this avenue 
may be unavailable to targets of potential reprisal; the Wilsons’ 
private suit against Administration leakers, Wilson v. Libby,
147
 was in 
fact dismissed by the D.C. Court of Appeals.
148
 In Wilson v. Libby, 
the Wilsons alleged both constitutional and tortious violations of their 
privacy.
149
 Their constitutional claims fell under the Privacy Act, a 
federal law that “provides for criminal penalties against federal 
officials who willfully disclose a record in violation of the Act.”
150
  
The court noted the Act intentionally excludes the Offices of the 
President and Vice President from criminal liability.
151
 The court 
dismissed the Wilsons’ constitutional claims against the 
Administration’s major decision makers for two reasons. First, the 
court held that where Congress has intentionally withheld a remedy, 
the court will not make one available for the plaintiff.
152
 It did not 
matter that this finding would effectively immunize the Offices of the 
 
 144. Cooper, supra note 138. 
 145. See Richard Leiby, Valerie Plame, the Spy Who Got Shoved Out Into the Cold, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 29, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/ 
10/28/AR2005102801172.html.  
 146. See Jurors Convict Libby on Four of Five Charges, supra note 140. 
 147. 535 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 148. Id. at 701. 
 149. Id. at 702–03. 
 150. Id. at 707. For the Privacy Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012). 
 151. Wilson, 535 F.3d at 701. 
 152. Id. at 709–10. 
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President and Vice President from suit. Second, the court was 
concerned about the sensitive nature of the case and the potential for 
national security information to become central to the proceedings.
153
 
The court also dismissed the Wilsons’ tort claim after finding the 
Wilsons had not exhausted their administrative remedies.
154
 The 
Wilsons’ suit in its entirety was dismissed.
155
 
VI. JOHN BRADY KIESLING AND THE IRAQ WAR 
Another instance of dissent going public occurred shortly before 
the Wilson episode.
156
 John Brady Kiesling was a career diplomat 
serving in the U.S. embassy in Athens who opposed the 
Administration’s unilateral approach to the Iraq War.
157
 In February 
2003, Kiesling submitted his resignation through the Dissent Channel 
and media.
158
 Like Wilson’s op-ed, Kiesling’s dissent record did not 
follow the traditional form of the Dissent Channel memorandum.
159
 
Kiesling started his letter by personalizing himself and expressing his 
faith in the United States.
160
 He then criticized the Administration for 
its unilateral approach to foreign policy because the strategy, he 
argued, alienated U.S. allies.
161
 Even though the resignation letter 
was addressed to Secretary of State Colin Powell, it was easily 
comprehended by a wider audience.
162
 The letter itself, although 
submitted through the Dissent Channel, ended up in the congressional 
record and was published in the New York Times, indicating a 
purposeful release of the letter to the public.
163
 
 
 153. Id. at 710. 
 154. Id. at 711–12. 
 155. Id. at 713. 
 156. Kiesling, supra note 5. 
 157. Id. 
 158. GURMAN, supra note 7, at 192. 
 159. See FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL, supra note 13, § 073.  
 160. Kiesling, supra note 5. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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Kiesling, along with other diplomats, would later state he resigned 
because it was “the only honorable way open to us.”
164
 After 
resigning, Kiesling and his band of dissenters were relegated to the 
sidelines: Ann Wright, who had worked in Afghanistan, became an 
“anti-war activist” and author;
165
 John Brown, who had worked 
primarily in Eastern Europe, went into academia;
166
 and Kiesling 
himself settled in Greece, where he worked as an author.
167
 
Although these diplomats suffered an initial loss of work, their 
later employment prospects—as with the Wilsons’—indicates a 
potential drawback to protecting dissenting diplomats: the 
sensationalization of dissent. Indeed, a book deal gave Kiesling a 
personal financial interest in keeping his name in the news.
168
 Both 
Joseph and Valerie Plame Wilson wrote books in the aftermath of the 
leak controversy,
169
 and, in 2010, those books were made into a 
movie.
170
 The opportunity for lucrative exploitation of dissent could 
weaken the prospect for public dissent to be a robust check on 
executive power. 
VII. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION: THE NSA LEAK 
The recent revelations of Edward Snowden demonstrate how 
whistleblowing continues to have substantial implications for the 
bureaucratic system. Although he was not a diplomat, Snowden’s 
case reveals the potential consequences dissent can have for the 
United States. One of the NSA’s missions is to “[c]ollect (including 
 
 164. Ann Wright, John Brown & Brady Kiesling, Why We Said No: Three Diplomats’ 
Duty, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-brady-kiesling/ 
why-we-said-no-three-dipl_b_92488.html. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Associated Press, Wilson Signs Book Deal on Life and Leak, FOX NEWS (Oct. 8, 
2003), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/10/08/wilson-signs-book-deal-on-life-and-leak/; 
see JOHN BRADY KIESLING, DIPLOMACY LESSONS: REALISM FOR AN UNLOVED SUPERPOWER 
(2006). 
 169. JOSEPH WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH (2004); VALERIE PLAME WILSON, FAIR 
GAME (2007). 
 170. A.O. Scott, Marital Strife and C.I.A. Obligations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/05/movies/05fair.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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through clandestine means), process, analyze, produce, and 
disseminate signals intelligence information and data” for the United 
States and its allies.
171
 While working as a government contractor for 
the NSA in the spring of 2013, Snowden copied and removed 
classified intelligence documents.
172
 A few weeks later, two major 
newspapers, the Washington Post and the Guardian, published the 
first NSA secrets.
173
 Snowden’s leak revealed that the NSA manages 
a large-scale data collection operation that includes the covert 
collection of personal data stored by major online firms, such as 
Google and Yahoo.
174
 Snowden later distributed documents showing 
the United States spied on many countries, including China,
175
 
India,
176
 Mexico,
177
 Brazil,
178
 France,
179
 Germany,
180
 Spain,
181
 
Indonesia,
182
 and the Vatican.
183
 
 
 171. Mission, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY/CENT. SEC. SERV. (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.nsa.gov/ 
about/mission/index.shtml.  
 172. Michael Kelly & Mike Nudelman, The Snowden Saga: Here’s Everything We Know 
about the NSA’s Nightmare Leak, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.business 
insider.com/everything-we-know-about-snowden-leaks-2013-11.                                                     
 173. A Timeline of Edward Snowden’s Life, WASH. POST, available at http://apps. 
washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/a-timeline-of-edward-snowdens-life/235/ (last visited Nov. 
22, 2013). 
 174. Gellman & Soltani, supra note 92. 
 175. Mark Clayton, NSA Cyber Spying on China Not a Surprise, but It’s Not Ho-Hum, 
Either, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 14, 2013, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
layout/set/r14/USA/Foreign-Policy/2013/0614/NSA-cyber-spying-on-China-not-a-surprise-but-
it-s-not-ho-hum-either-video. 
 176. Glenn Greenwald & Shobhan Saxena, India Among Top Targets of Spying by NSA, 
HINDU (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-among-top-targets-of-
spying-by-nsa/article5157526.ece. 
 177. Jens Glüsing et al., Fresh Leak on US Spying: NSA Accessed Mexican President’s 
Email, SPIEGEL (Oct. 20, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-
account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Jacques Follorou & Glenn Greenwald, France in the NSA’s Crosshair: Phone 
Networks Under Surveillance, LE MONDE, Oct. 21, 2013, available at http://www.lemonde.fr/ 
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3499741_ 651865.html. 
 180. Mark Mazzetti & David E. Sanger, Tap on Merkel Provides Peek at Vast Spy Net, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/world/europe/tap-
on-merkel-provides-peek-at-vast-spy-net.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0.  
 181. Miguel González, NSA Revelations: Spain Also a Victim of US Espionage, EL PAÍS 
(Oct. 25, 2013), http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/10/25/inenglish/1382703360_329586.html.  
 182. Ewen MacAskill & Lenore Taylor, NSA: Australia and US Used Climate Change 
Conference to Spy on Indonesia, GUARDIAN, Nov. 2, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian 
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Soon after the initial leak, Snowden revealed his motivation to go 
public. In a video interview with Glenn Greenwald of the Guardian, 
Snowden said that in his position with the NSA, he was exposed to 
“disturbing” information about the scope of the NSA’s surveillance 
programs.
184
 He indicated he told others in the NSA about his 
concerns but that he was ignored.
185
 He said:  
[O]ver time, that awareness of wrongdoing sort of builds up, 
and you feel compelled to talk about it, and the more you talk 
about it, the more you’re ignored, the more you’re told it’s not 
a problem until eventually you realize that these things need to 
be determined by the public, not by somebody who was simply 
hired by the government.
186
  
Snowden claimed he had nowhere to turn, in an organization where 
the perceived abuses of power were part of “the normal state of 
business.”187 Snowden looked outside the organization, finding 
members of the media who were willing to publish the documents he 
had taken. 
Snowden now resides in Russia, although the details of his living 
situation are unknown.
188
 He has continued to leak information about 
NSA spying programs to media outlets.
189
  
Snowden’s leaks have had economic and political ramifications. 
Some major American technology firms are expecting lower profits 
because of increased distrust in emerging markets.
190
 Countries 
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 184. Poitras, supra note 16. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Alice Speri, Mystery Surrounds Snowden’s Secret Moscow Life, AL JAZEERA AM. 
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/11/21/mystery-surroundssnowdens 
secretmoscowlife.html.  
 189. Eaton, supra note 183. 
 190. Matthew Miller, Spy Scandal Weighs on U.S. Tech Firms in China, Cisco Takes Hit, 
REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/14/us-china-cisco-idUSBR 
E9AD0J420131114; Yves Smith, Wolf Richter: NSA Spying Crushes US Tech Companies in 
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around the world are rethinking their reliance on the United States for 
Internet services, and the potential fracturing of the Internet into 
multiple regional networks could greatly hinder economic integration 
and slow innovation.
191
 In the United States, Congress held hearings 
on NSA activities as part of an ongoing investigation and 
reassessment of national security operations.
192
 A legal challenge to 
NSA activities is also ongoing; the American Civil Liberties Union is 
challenging part of the NSA surveillance of U.S. citizens and is 
seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the NSA from continuing 
these practices.
193
 In a separate suit brought by two American citizens 
seeking an injunction against the NSA, a judge ruled the NSA 
surveillance activities likely violated the Fourth Amendment, 
although he did not reach the merits of the case.
194
 
If Snowden did report his concerns about NSA surveillance to his 
superiors and his superiors did nothing, then Snowden’s example 
makes the most compelling call for change in managing government 
employees’ dissent. At a time when so much information is stored 
electronically, even a low-level employee like Snowden can wreak 
havoc on U.S. government programs. If there is no mechanism to 
effectively deal with cases of internal dissent, employees are more 
likely to publicly dissent and leak classified information. Snowden is 
one of a long line of dissenters who went public, and, unless U.S. 
dissent policy changes, he will not be the last.  
 
Emerging Markets (“An Industry Phenomenon,” Says Cisco’s Chambers), NAKED CAPITALISM 
(Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/11/wolf-richter-nsa-spying-crushes-us-
tech-companies-in-emerging-markets-an-industry-phenomenon-says-ciscos-chambers.html. 
 191. Matthew Taylor et al., NSA Surveillance May Cause Breakup of Internet, Warn 
Experts, GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/ 
01/nsa-surveillance-cause-internet-breakup-edward-snowden. 
 192. Tabassum Zakaria & Deborah Charles, NSA Chief Defends Agency Amid U.S. Spy Rift 
with Europe, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/29/us-usa-
security-nsa-idUSBRE99S03N20131029. 
 193. Mark Hamblett, Judge Hears ACLU Challenge to Phone Monitoring by NSA, N.Y. 
L.J. Nov. 25, 2013, available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id= 
1202629385845&Judge_Hears_ACLU_Challenge_to_Phone_Monitoring_by_NSA&slreturn= 
20131024164130. 
 194. Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0881, 2013 WL 6598728, at *24 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 16, 
2013). 
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VIII. ANALYSIS 
The President holds significant power over international relations. 
This power stems from the President’s authority to appoint and 
remove the Secretary of State and other diplomats,
195
 as well as the 
President’s ability to propose official treaties and bypass Congress 
through executive agreements.
196
 The Founders’ intention to base 
American governance on checks and balances has been eroded over 
time in the area of foreign policy.
197
 International agreements, which 
can have significant impacts on domestic governance and individual 
rights,
198
 no longer need the consent of the legislature to go into 
effect.
199
 
This is not a new development. During the Mexican-American 
War, this erosion of checks and balances was already apparent. 
President Polk’s monopoly over foreign policy likely enabled him to 
incite a war.
200
 And he would have been able to continue it, were it 
not for the resistance of his diplomat, Nicholas Trist. 
On the morning of December 4, the day Trist was scheduled to 
leave Mexico, he began writing a letter to his wife detailing his trip 
home.
201
 In a postscript to the letter, Trist revealed his mind had 
changed over the course of the day. 
Knowing it to be the very last chance and impressed with the 
dreadful consequences to our country which cannot fail to 
attend the loss of that chance, I will make a treaty if it can be 
 
 195. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 314–15 (1903). 
 196. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003). 
 197. See supra notes 28–38 and accompanying text. 
 198. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
390, 396–97 (1998). 
 199. See Hathaway, supra note 11, at 1244–46, 1255. 
 200. The annexation of Texas in 1845, completed by President John Tyler immediately 
before Polk’s inauguration, was a direct challenge to Mexican claims to Texas. MATTHEWS, 
supra note 51, at 12–13. Just months after Polk took office, he unilaterally ordered U.S. troops 
into the most disputed Texas territory at the border with Mexico. Id. U.S. soldiers eventually 
were ordered so deep into Mexican territory that they raised an American flag on the north bank 
of the Rio Grande. Id. at 13–15, 17. Violence, and an official declaration of war, followed 
shortly thereafter. U.S.-Mexican War: Timeline Map, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/kera/usmexican 
war/timeline_flash.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2012). 
 201. DREXLER, supra note 1, at 112. 
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done on the basis of the Bravo [Rio Grande], by the 32° [of 
latitude], giving $15 million . . . . This determination I came to 
this day at 12 o’clock.
202
 
Trist’s individual initiative, triggered by his personal moral 
concerns, checked the President’s power to control foreign 
relations. 
Trist’s way of countering the President involved more than just 
the courage of one diplomat. It required a complex cadre of actors, all 
willing to challenge executive power and the resultant specter of 
congressional action. President Polk had to consider Congress’s 
power over appropriations and the accompanying power to defund 
the war when he received Trist’s treaty.
203
 Competing political 
factions within Congress also prevented the President from burying 
the treaty.
204
 By inadvertently making Congress a factor, Trist was 
able to counter a powerful President. 
However, just because the President can exercise the power to 
quash a diplomat’s proposal does not mean the President will. Much 
of the debate on executive power involves how much of the 
President’s power should be explicitly checked—procedurally or by a 
different branch
205
—and how much should be implicitly checked, 
politically.
206
 The debate on the legality of the Affordable Care Act, 
for example, raised questions about whether Congress could mandate 
citizen purchases of broccoli under the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution.
207
 Should such a power be explicitly limited by a 
Supreme Court interpretation or implicitly limited by political 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 127. 
 204. OHRT, supra note 53, at 148–49. 
 205. Congress can be used, even in the area of foreign policy where the President has 
traditionally held much power, to regulate executive power. Abner S. Greene, Checks and 
Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 124 (1994). 
 206. The political check is “simply the impact of national policy on private activity and the 
imposition on the administrative and financial costs of enforcing national policies on the 
national electorate.” La Pierre, supra note 133, at 1052.  
 207. See James B. Stewart, How Broccoli Landed on Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 13, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/business/how-broccoli-became-
a-symbol-in-the-health-care-debate.html?pagewanted=all.  
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accountability?
208
 Is the “political necessity of placating 
constituents”
209
 a sufficient check in itself, making branch-to-branch 
checks and balances unnecessary? Different mechanisms of checking 
power can be more or less effective given the context of a particular 
decision. 
A. Legislative Check 
One way to check executive power over foreign policy would be 
to enable diplomats to use Congress. Essentially, a dissenting 
diplomat would have to trigger congressional review.
210
 A conflict 
between the President and Congress would have one of three 
potential outcomes: the President could defuse conflict with Congress 
and tailor the treaty through negotiation and compromise, eventually 
sending it to Congress for approval;
211
 the President could be 
adamant about the treaty’s language and act unilaterally, but the 
President would then face an uphill battle because of Congress’s 
control over appropriations;
212
 or the President could not act at all, 
allowing the treaty to die. This latter option could be overridden by 
Congress by trying to pass the proposal as it would a bill, potentially 
over the President’s veto.
213
 Congress could be a diplomat’s ultimate 
tool to counter the President’s power, especially given that Congress 
was designed, in part, to check the President.
214
 
 
 208. See id.  
 209. See Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 
1532 (1992). 
 210. Congress needs a way to influence the President. This may most easily be met through 
the Constitution’s spending clause, which provides Congress with the power over the purse. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see Peter M. Shane, When Inter-branch Norms Break Down: Of 
Arms-for-Hostages, “Orderly Shutdowns,” Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial “Coups,” 
12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 503, 519–20 (2003). Additionally, the Constitution requires the 
President receive Senate approval to enact treaties. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. However, this 
requirement can be bypassed. See Hathaway, supra note 11, at 1244–46, 1255. 
 211. The proposal could be approved either as a treaty by the Senate or as a Congressional-
Executive agreement. See Hathaway, supra note 11, at 1244–46, 1255.  
 212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see Shane, supra note 210. 
 213. An adamant President would have veto power over this procedure, but Congress could 
overturn the veto with a supermajority vote. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 214. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
286 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 45:259 
 
 
However, political realities make a direct appeal to Congress less 
attractive. Congress is susceptible to political intrigue and the 
resulting deadlock.
215
 The presidential veto is also a major 
obstacle.
216
 The daunting challenge of convincing a supermajority of 
both the House and Senate to override the President has contributed 
to Congress’s complacency in the area of foreign policy.
217
 Adding to 
the challenge, multiple decisions by the Supreme Court have 
provided the executive branch much legal deference in interpreting 
grants of power and determining appropriate conduct,
218
 and have 
limited the procedures Congress can use to check the President.
219
 
B. Judicial Check 
Another potential check to balance the executive’s power over 
foreign policy might be through the judiciary. But the Constitution 
explicitly leaves the judiciary out of the treaty-making process.
220
 
Judicial doctrine has also weakened Congress’s ability to check the 
President.
221
 However, the courts could be used to support a private 
right of action for dissenters, providing protection for them from 
reprisal. When faced with that situation, the D.C. Circuit Court 
denied such protections for dissenters, instead choosing to protect the 
executive from the consequences of seeking reprisal, bolstering the 
President’s power over foreign policy.
222
 Even in the wake of judicial 
 
 215. For a recent example concerning the deadlock over the “fiscal cliff,” see Richard 
Cowan & Jeff Mason, Obama Promotes Tax Agenda, Congress in Stand-off, REUTERS (Nov. 
27, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/27/us-usa-fiscal-idUSBRE8A80WV2012 
1127. Congressional deadlock is not only a challenge of the modern era. See The Great Senate 
Deadlock of 1881, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/ 
Senate_Deadlock_1881.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
 216. Katyal, supra note 17, at 2320–21. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 2321.  
 219. Id. at 2320. Specifically, the nondelegation doctrine, which has been generally 
interpreted to provide the executive branch with great discretion in the administrative area, and 
the invalidation of the legislative veto, which had allowed one chamber of Congress to veto 
certain executive actions, have increased executive power in relation to congressional power. 
See id. 
 220. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2. 
 221. Katyal, supra note 17, at 190–91. 
 222. Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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abdication, “[t]he political and administrative processes may serve as 
substitutes for private lawsuits to deter arbitrary government 
action.”
223
 In Wilson v. Libby, the court did not foreclose an 
administrative remedy for those claiming to have suffered from 
reprisal.
224
 
C. Administrative Check and Deliberation Requirements 
The power of executive agencies leaves open the door to an 
administrative check on the President through the executive branch 
itself.
225
 “[B]ureaucratic overlap, civil-service protections, internal 
adjudication, and reporting requirements” could be means to check a 
President’s power, including in the area of foreign policy.
226
 But the 
President retains a large amount of power over the makeup of the 
executive branch,
227
 and particular Presidents will be more or less 
keen on limiting their power and the speed at which their orders can 
be enacted due to the imposition of a more deliberative process.
228
 
Even in the absence of total presidential cooperation, the judicial or 
legislative branches could impose deliberation requirements on the 
President, essentially imposing internal checks within the executive 
branch as a substitute for external checks the other branches have 
failed to impose.
229
 But the courts have not imposed such checks, and 
Congress is still susceptible to deadlock. Acting alone, these two 
branches have each failed to check the President at crucial moments 
in matters of foreign policy.
230
   
 
 223. Krent, supra note 209, at 1532. 
 224. 535 F.3d at 711–12. 
 225. See Katyal, supra note 17, at 2322. 
 226. Id. at 2348–49. 
 227. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. 
 228. Katyal, supra note 17, at 2340. For a comparison between the different preferences of 
two Presidents, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Dwight D. Eisenhower, see id. at 2325–26. 
 229. Id. at 2340–41. 
 230. See id. 
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D. Political Check 
Dissent reporting requirements could give Congress the evidence 
it needs to leverage the political check and balance executive 
power.
231
 Although Congress is not currently positioned to check the 
President in foreign policy, and the judicial branch has generally 
refrained from restraining the executive, the Administration is still 
susceptible to the influence of public opinion.
232
 By harnessing 
public opinion, Congress might have a way of checking the President 
in a “nontraditional” manner, bypassing the constitutional 
requirement of majoritarian consensus by empowering individual 
members of Congress through mass media.
233
 The political check, 
especially through the use of media outlets, may thus be the most 
realistic mechanism available to diplomats today.
234
 Trist, Wilson, 
and Kiesling all made use of the political check and media. 
Although all three of these diplomats helped inform and shape 
debate, none were protected from reprisal. President Polk fired Trist 
and refused to pay him, leaving Trist to struggle to support his family 
for most of the remainder of his life.
235
 The Wilsons were likely 
targets of a smear campaign.
236
 And while Kiesling has not been the 
victim of overt reprisal, today, he can only comment from the outside 
looking in.
237
  
For the political check to be effective, dissenters must be 
protected from reprisal. Otherwise, the threat of being ostracized 
might prevent many dissenters from speaking out. Because of the 
 
 231. See id. at 2342. 
 232. See The President’s Role in the Legislative Process, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2068, 2085 
(2012), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/125/june12/index.php.  
 233. Id. at 2088–89. 
 234. Thomas Jefferson once wrote that “the only security of all, is in a free press. The force 
of public opinion cannot be resisted, when permitted freely to be expressed. The agitation it 
produces must be submitted to. It is necessary to keep the waters pure.” THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
Letter to the Marquis De La Fayette, in 3 THOMAS JEFFERSON, MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, 
AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 393, 393 (Thomas Jefferson Rudolph ed., 1829). 
The media was meant to play an important role in the federalist system by enabling the political 
check. 
 235. OHRT, supra note 53, at 155–62. 
 236. Wilson, supra note 134; Stewart, supra note 134. 
 237. See Wright, Brown & Kiesling, supra note 164.  
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inefficacy of the current internal dissent mechanism, these 
protections should not only apply to those who maintain their dissent 
within the bureaucracy.
238
 Dissenters who go outside of the Dissent 
Channel and seek to activate the political check need real protections 
as well. 
If dissent is protected, we must also have a mechanism to check 
dissenters. Dissenters have a duty to represent the American people, 
acting as their advocate on the international stage. A check on 
dissenters is important, because there is a risk the diplomat or 
government employee may ultimately associate with a counter-party 
country due to interpersonal ties or long-term exposure.
239
 For 
example, Trist’s personal feelings played a meaningful role in the 
negotiation of the treaty ending the Mexican-American War.
240
  
This check on dissenters could exist in the form of procedure. 
Dissenters seeking protection could be required to demonstrate they 
did all they could to keep dissent within the bureaucracy, but urgency 
or inefficacy proved these efforts futile and public dissent 
 
 238. See supra notes 119–28 and accompanying text. 
 239. For a critical discussion of how a diplomat can inadvertently become an advocate for a 
notion of the common good and thus compromise the negotiation process, see FRED CHARLES 
IKLE, HOW NATIONS NEGOTIATE 146 (1964). Ikle touches on a second concern in giving a 
diplomat wide authority. Oftentimes, a completed agreement can act as a fait accompli and may 
have a much greater motivating effect on Congress than if the agreement had simply been 
offered as an unconcluded proposal. Id. at 134–35. 
 240. When Trist was sixty-three and his family near destitute, Trist’s wife, Virginia, sent a 
letter to a man who was known to be politically influential. In the letter, Virginia Trist wrote: 
But, said [Nicholas Trist] to us in relating it, “Could those Mexicans have seen into my 
heart at that moment, they would have known that my feeling of shame as an 
American was far stronger than theirs could be as Mexicans. For although it would not 
have done for me to say so there, that was a thing for every right-minded American to 
be ashamed of, and I was ashamed of it, most cordially & intensely ashamed of it. This 
had been my feeling at all our conferences, and especially at moments when I had felt 
it necessary to insist upon things which they were averse to. Had my course at such 
moments been governed by my conscience as a man, and my sense of justice as an 
individual American, I should have yielded in every instance. . . . My object, through 
out was, not to obtain all I could, but on the contrary to make the treaty as little 
exacting as possible from Mexico, as was compatible with its being accepted at home.” 
Letter from Virginia Trist to Mr. Tuckerman (Aug. 23, 1863, as an enclosure to a letter dated 
July 8, 1864) (on file with the University of North Carolina Wilson Library under Nicholas 
Philip Trist Papers 1765–1903, Collection No. 02104, folder 225), available at 
http://www2.lib.unc.edu/mss/inv/t/Trist,Nicholas_Philip.html# folder_225#1 (Folder 225, Scan 
10-27, 20).  
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necessary.
241
 If dissenters receive no protection, the current dissent 
mechanisms will continue to be ineffective, and the President will 
maintain what is essentially a monopoly power over the country’s 
foreign policy. 
E. Designing an Effective Dissent Process 
Ultimately, the U.S. government should use the passion of 
dissenters to improve policy. Dissenters will not have to go outside 
the internal bureaucracy if the process allows dissenters to effectively 
voice their concerns. A collaborative approach to designing a 
complaint process could potentially improve upon the current system 
by involving diverse and experienced stakeholders.
242
 Because the 
current process fails to address workers’ concerns, whether these 
workers are diplomats or lower-level technicians, a carefully 
designed process could proactively address disputes by giving 
disgruntled workers a “safe space” to raise issues and the confidence 
that their views will be heard.
243
  
The most essential step in creating a new process for dissent will 
be identifying the proper stakeholders.
244
 Process designers need to 
be creative to deal with the complexity of dissent, and must involve 
many stakeholders from every branch of government. Indeed, 
involving stakeholders from every branch might spur proposals for 
more cross-branch dissent mechanisms.  
 One proposal, for example, allows dissenters in the executive 
branch to seek access to Congress or the courts if their voices are 
neglected within their agencies. A dissenter could simply have the 
formalized and protected option of going to Congress or a court with 
a dissent paper confidentially. This option would strengthen the 
 
 241. For example, the whistleblowing provision of Sarbanes-Oxley requires claimants to 
exhaust administrative remedies through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
before seeking court review. Beverley H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of 
Whistleblower Protection Under Sarbanes-Oxley: A Proposal for Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 
3, 40–43 (2007). Congress or agencies could develop a mechanism based on the same 
principles for foreign policy dissenters. 
 242. NANCY H. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING 
DISPUTES 132–35 (2013). 
 243. Id. at 123–25. 
 244. Id. at 70–73. 
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Dissent Channel process now in action. Foreign Service superiors 
would know dissent ignored within the Department could quickly be 
transmitted to another branch with the ability to check executive 
power. If the executive refused to submit to this check, a 
congressional committee could release the dissent document to the 
media, or, under specific circumstances, a court could publish its 
opinion, activating a political check. The government could design a 
process that uses confidentiality and openness appropriately to 
improve the balance of foreign relations power in the federalist 
system.
245
  
IX. CONCLUSION 
The United States system of government was based on shared 
responsibility, where the interests of one branch would be countered 
by another.
246
 As the Republic has aged, the President, insufficiently 
checked by Congress and the courts, has consolidated power over 
foreign policy. Bureaucratic reforms could improve the system in 
place today by imposing checks from within the executive branch, 
but the President maintains much control over the components of the 
Administration, and those with power are often reluctant to give up 
power. To balance the terms of engagement between the coordinate 
branches of government in this era, Congress and dissenters, together, 
must turn to the political check, exploiting the political accountability 
of the President to curb the office’s power. 
The government should design a new process through which 
employees can safely register dissent. By including the option for 
dissenters to go outside the executive branch, executive branch 
leaders will have a greater incentive to create a collaborative work 
environment that addresses dissent proactively and uses it 
constructively. Even with a better dissent process, not everyone will 
agree on every issue. But an effective dissent process will subject 
leaders to external checks from the other branches of government and 
from the people when those leaders abuse their power or are 
unwilling to justify policies that affect the American people. 
 
 245. See id. at 180–85. 
 246. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
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When acting alone, Congress, courts, and dissenters have each 
been unable to check the executive. Congress and the courts have 
authorized wide presidential discretion amidst the backdrop of 
political deadlock, and dissenters can only get so far as media outlets 
can propel them. In short, Congress has the political power but lacks 
a cohesive message, and dissenters have a cohesive message but little 
political power. The federal power generated by either the legislative 
or judicial branch, in combination with dissenters—providing 
political or legal backing to a compelling criticism of executive 
power—could be sufficient to constructively challenge the executive 
and return balance to the Republic.  
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